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Contract Regulation, With and Without the State:
Ruminations on Rules and their Sources. A Comment
on Jürgen Basedow, The State’s Private Law and the
Economy—Commercial Law as an Amalgam of Public
and Private Rule-Making
This paper, commenting on the work of Jürgen Basedow,
addresses the legal regulation of economic relations in the context of
globalization. The paper applies the idea of the mixed jurisdiction,
traditionally focused on legal systems that partake of both the
common law and the civil law, to the complex of privately made law
and publicly made law that governs contemporary economic
relations. Differing criteria that might be used to assess and choose
between competing rules or competing systems of rule generation are
evaluated, and normative considerations are raised. The paper
proposes a model to demonstrate how privately made law, though
generated by and adopted in the marketplace, can nevertheless be
inefficient economically and questionable politically. The conclusion
offers the musical metaphor of a trill to appreciate the dynamics
involved in regulating economic relations in a world where rules may
come from several states or from private entities.
The symposium called for these papers to consider “The State’s
Private Law and the Economy,” a topic interesting enough, not least
because it raises essential questions about what might be meant by
the phrase. Jürgen Basedow’s article raises this issue, concentrating
on two different sorts of private law: “non-state rules governing
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economic life”1 (which I will call privately made law) and “state law”
governing economic life2 (which I will call publicly made law).3 For
introductory purposes—and at this point speaking roughly—both the
state law and the non-state law, or in other words, both the publicly
made law and the privately made law, are within the sphere of
private law. This sphere stands in classic, if questionable,
contradistinction to public law. These carefully drawn categories
give structure and life to Professor Basedow’s appreciation of this
topic, and this comment will follow those categories.
While sympathetic to this approach, one aside should be given
voice before we cross the threshold of this lively structure. Curiously,
particularly to American eyes, Professor Basedow’s paper does not
engage in any extensive economic analysis of either privately made
law or publicly made law.4 The paper sometimes discusses
economics, to be sure. For example, it underlines how the Coase
theorem, together with Cooter and Ulen’s corollary, leads to “the
implication that property rights must be assigned by the State” to
assure “efficient use of resources.”5 But even with points like this
one, the paper seems akin to the more humanistic approach to
economics that might be associated with scholars like Allan
Farnsworth.6 Professor Basedow’s article is not the sort that would
likely be classified as a work within any of the several schools of law
and economics current in the American academy, whether Judge
Posner’s neoclassical law and economics, or the newer behavioral law
and economics, or law and socioeconomics, or even Austrian
economics. That a paper devoted to “The State’s Private Law and the
Economy” does not easily fall into some such category is remarkable
enough in a comparison of German and American approaches to
legal scholarship. It is perhaps some testimony to the limited
reception of thick economic analysis in the German legal academy,7
1. See Jürgen Basedow, The State’s Private Law and the Economy, 56 AM. J.
COMP. L. 703, 708 (2008).
2. Id. at 715-19. I use rules in a rough sense to include rules, norms, standards,
and perhaps principles; I believe Basedow is following this usage as well.
3. My phraseology is explained in David V. Snyder, Private Lawmaking, 64
OHIO ST. L.J. 371, 375-76 (2003) [hereinafter Snyder, Private Lawmaking]; cf. Ralf
Michaels & Nils Jansen, Private Law Beyond the State? Europeanization,
Globalization, Privatization, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 843, 850 (2006).
4. Professor Basedow does use a somewhat more explicit economic approach in
another, related paper. See Jürgen Basedow, Lex Mercatoria and the Private
International Law of Contracts in Economic Perspective, in AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 57 (Jürgen Basedow & Toshiyuki Kono eds., 2006).
5. Basedow, supra note 1, at 717.
6. See, e.g., E. Allan Farnsworth, Damages and Specific Relief, 27 AM. J. COMP.
L. 247, 247-48, 251 (1979).
7. See Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt & Carmen L. Brun, Lost in Translation: The
Economic Analysis of Law in the United States and Europe, 44 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 602 (2006). I do not wish to overemphasize the point; any subscriber
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although not too much should be extrapolated from a single datum.
In any case, the fact that the principal article is not devoted to
extended or formal economic analysis is merely an aside. I wish to
turn to three other points, and at the end, I will offer a metaphor.
The first section applies the idea of the mixed jurisdiction to the
structure of lawmaking considered in these papers. A stylized
example is given to illustrate potential problems of efficiency and
political economy even for privately made rules. The next section
suggests some of the differing criteria that might be used to assess
and choose between competing rules or competing systems of rule
generation. The third section briefly raises the normative issue, and
the final section offers the metaphorical conclusion.
I.

WE ALL LIVE IN A MIXED JURISDICTION NOW

The “mixed jurisdiction,” an object of fascination for scholars of
comparative law, provides a nice framework for understanding the
legal dynamic that Professor Basedow describes. Traditionally
scholars have used the term to describe places where both the
common law and civil law govern, such as Scotland, South Africa,
Louisiana, Quebec, and perhaps a dozen or so others.8 The term is
sometimes used to include any jurisdiction with competing legal
systems as sources of law, though they may not be so easily
categorized as common law or civil law. Recently, an alternative
approach to classifying mixed jurisdictions has emerged, and
interested researchers have begun to apply their tools and analyses
to jurisdictions characterized by a plural legal order.9 On this theory,
to the Social Science Research Network will see legions of articles from European
scholars who are doing economic work in the law. Still, there does seem to be
something to this notion; one of the German conference participants most immersed
in economic analysis has himself discussed the issue. See Christian Kirchner, The
Difficult Reception of Law and Economics in Germany, 11 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 277
(1991); see also Kristoffel R. Grechenig & Martin Gelter, The Transatlantic
Divergence in Legal Thought: American Law and Economics vs. German
Doctrinalism (U. St. Gallen L. & Econ. Working Paper No. 25, 2007), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1019437.
8. For a recent survey, see Jacques du Plessis, Comparative Law and the Study
of Mixed Legal Systems, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 477, 484
(Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006). The traditional view was
stated influentially in the work of Sir Thomas Smith. See, e.g., T.B. Smith, The
Preservation of the Civilian Tradition in ‘Mixed Jurisdictions,’ in CIVIL LAW IN THE
MODERN WORLD (Athanassios N. Yiannopoulos ed., 1965); T.B. Smith, The Common
Law Cuckoo: Problems of a ‘Mixed’ Legal System with Special Reference to Restrictive
Interpretations in the Scots Law of Obligations, [1956] Butterworth’s SALR 147,
reprinted in T.B. SMITH, STUDIES CRITICAL & COMPARATIVE 89 (1962).
9. For reflections on this point, see Vernon Valentine Palmer, Mixed Legal
Systems . . . and the Myth of Pure Laws, 67 LA. L. REV. 1205, 1205-09 (2007); see also
the study by the Law Faculty of the University of Ottawa that is discussed in du
Plessis, supra note 8, at 482. Cf. Michaels & Jansen, supra note 3, at 876 (describing
jurisdictions that owe “allegiance to numerous different normative orders.”).
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work on legal pluralism and mixed jurisdictions begins to merge.
A.

A Mixture of Publicly and Privately Made Laws

With this understanding, coupled with the insights of Professor
Basedow’s paper, we come to see that we all live in a mixed
jurisdiction now, even without enjoying a legally exotic location like
Scotland or Louisiana. Private law, Professor Basedow shows,
results from two competing sources: organs of the state and
organizations of private parties. The state and non-state systems
sometimes complement each other and sometimes compete. The
competition occurs in the dialectic that is observable in some
reasonably familiar areas of transnational economic regulation.
Although state sovereignty might be presumed to win such
competitions, experience shows that sometimes privately made law
prevails.10
Following Professor Basedow’s lead, the law on letters of credit
provides a fine example. These financial and legal instruments have
for centuries been governed by international customs, and these
customs have long been codified by the International Chamber of
Commerce in the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary
Credits (or the UCP, as it is called).11 At the same time, letters of
credit are governed in the United States by state law, particularly
Article 5 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). Before its 1995
revision, Article 5 was dissonant with the UCP in a number of
important respects, including basic issues of revocability and
preclusion. One of the chief goals of the revision was to “[h]armonize”
Article 5 with the UCP, and this harmonization was vaunted by its

10. Cf. Basedow, supra note 1, at 720 (“the State may interfere with private
rules by appropriate legislation or court decisions at any time”). See also Ralf
Michaels, The Re-state-ment of Non-State Law: The State, Choice of Law, and the
Challenge from Global Legal Pluralism, 51 WAYNE L. REV. 1209, 1236-37 (“The state
can only hope to maintain its legitimacy and the legitimacy of its lawmaking
monopoly if it gives non-state communities sufficient space for the development and
enforcement of their own norms.”).
11. The current version is generally known as UCP-600 (eff. July 1, 2007). See
INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ICC UNIFORM CUSTOMS AND PRACTICE FOR
DOCUMENTARY CREDITS: UCP 600 (2007 rev.). The influence of the UCP that is
discussed in the text is based on UCP-500, which was in force from January 1, 1994
to June 30, 2007. See U.C.C. Article 5; see also Basedow, supra note 1, at 709-10;
Snyder, Private Lawmaking, supra note 3, at 389-95. Of course custom arises in
private law in many ways other than private codification. Deference to custom is
familiar in countless governmental codes, including the seminal French Code civil,
both in contract interpretation in general, see C. CIV. (Fr.) art. 1160, and in the more
tasty particular, see id. art. 1587 (tasting of wine and oil). For a more general view of
custom and its role in contract, see David V. Snyder, Language and Formalities in
Commercial Contracts: A Defense of Custom and Conduct, 54 SMU L. REV. 617
(2001) [hereinafter Snyder, Custom]. See also infra note 49 (on the debatable
efficiency of custom).
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sponsors as one of the chief benefits of the revision.12 Two systems,
publicly made law and privately made law, offered competing rules.
The privately made law prevailed.13
To be clear, the argument here is not that privately made law
will always prevail. How the systems react to each other and which
rules prevail in a system of both publicly and privately made law is a
large question on which Professor Basedow offers insights14 with
which I have no quarrel, although the question can also be analyzed
in the terms of political economy (such as federalism)15 or market
theory (regulatory competition).16 Nor is my point that the state and
private actors are inevitably in competition. Indeed, even law that
appears to come from the state is sometimes privately made before
the official state intermediation, and this is true not only as a deep
historical matter, as Professors Jansen and Michaels have shown,17
but is particularly true of the UCC, including Article 5.18 Rather, the
suggestion here is that there are competing sources of rules from
competing systems, some characterized more by their private origins
and some more by state intermediation. Thus the phenomena
Professor Basedow has described fit the broad theory of the mixed
jurisdiction.
For some purposes such a broad view could make the category of
the mixed jurisdiction limitless and therefore taxonomically useless,
or it could simply collapse into notions of legal pluralism.19 For other
purposes—bringing the lessons of mixed jurisdictions to a wider
world—the broad view is promising. This suggestion is related to
F.H. Lawson’s argument that the mixed jurisdiction is a potential
12. UCC Art. 5 prefatory note (“Harmonization with International Practice”
refers explicitly to the UCP and several areas of dissonance under the heading
“Balance of Benefits”).
13. This exposition simplifies the characterizations of these rulemaking systems,
and one might argue (as several have, including the present author) that the UCC
should itself be considered privately made law, to some degree. Even so, the UCC has
more hallmarks of publicly made law than does the UCP, for legislative enactment is
required in the case of the UCC, and thus the example holds. At the same time, such
worldly examples highlight an important qualification to the textual dialectic, for
often rules and the systems of making them will include both private and public
aspects. See generally Snyder, Private Lawmaking, supra note 3, at 378-80 (UCC);
see also id. at 389-95 (examining relation of UCC Article 5 to UCP); Basedow, supra
note 1, at 16. A similar point is discussed infra note 68.
14. Basedow, supra note 1, at 720-22.
15. See David V. Snyder, Molecular Federalism and the Structures of Private
Lawmaking, 14 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 419 (2007) [hereinafter Snyder,
Molecular Federalism].
16. Some entries into this large literature are collected in id. at 421 n.8.
17. Nils Jansen & Ralf Michaels, Private Law and the State: Comparative
Perceptions and Historical Observations, 71 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR
AUSLÄNDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT [RABELSZ] 345, 358-92 (2007).
18. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
19. See Palmer, supra note 9, at 1205 & n.2; du Plessis, supra note 8, at 481.
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source for “a future uniform law of the world,”20 or in other words, for
a law beyond the state. Indeed, this idea suggests a way to put
together the kinds of insights offered by Paul Schiff Berman on
global legal pluralism21 with the learning of the last few generations
on mixed jurisdictions. Professor Berman suggests the value of
sustaining and managing “hybridity” instead of suppressing it
through, for instance, universalist efforts to achieve uniformity.
Coupling this idea with Lawson’s admittedly different idea points to
a possible resolution of competing views as the world moves to a law
beyond the state. The answer might be found in an effort to achieve
a uniform recognition and management of multiple sources of law,
just as has existed for centuries in the several carefully studied
mixed jurisdictions.
This approach to regulation seems especially appropriate in the
context of these papers: economic relations. The law can realize the
efforts of multiple rule-makers, private and public, just as private
transactions capitalize on the multiple inputs and combinations,
sometimes cooperative and sometimes adversarial, of market actors.
Although I do not mean to suggest that the market for laws is the
same as the markets that those laws regulate,22 the similarity has to
be mentioned, particularly here. Markets, after all, have become
increasingly globalized. The development of a law beyond the state
may well be expected to follow the same generative dynamics that
loosened the bonds between markets and the state in the first place.
B.

Characteristics of the Competing Legal Systems: Of Economics
and Political Economy

From the recognition of the mixed nature of the current legal
order (in this context, the term jurisdiction seems narrow and
outmoded), it follows that the competing systems will require further
consideration. Given that they produce different rules, the fact that
they have different goals should hardly be surprising. Professor
Basedow goes to the heart of the issue when he notes that the goal of
a (presumably democratic) state will seek to protect society at large,
and state legislation could thus interfere with the privately ordered
affairs of a more particular group.23 On the other hand, he does not
20. F.H. Lawson, The Field of Comparative Law, 61 JURID. REV. 16, 26 (1949).
Lawson attributed the idea to Lévy-Ullmann. See also Palmer, supra note 9, at 121012.
21. See, e.g., Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV.
1155 (2007).
22. Erin O’Hara and Larry E. Ribstein have worked on these ideas for some
time. For a recent effort, see Rules and Institutions in Developing a Law Market:
Views from the U.S. and Europe, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1100277.
Their book, THE LAW MARKET, is forthcoming from Oxford University Press.
23. See Basedow, supra note 1, at 720.
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elaborate on the goals of private lawmakers, aside from their aim to
avoid the interference of public lawmakers.24 A few more words seem
in order.
Private rule-makers will plausibly have a number of additional
goals. Some are economic. Private groups may seek to reduce
transaction costs. By specifying many terms centrally (as in the UCP
or other trade codes),25 individual parties are saved the expense of
either specifying the terms individually or risking terms imposed by
a relatively ignorant tribunal. Another goal may be to seek the
benefits of uniformity when they outweigh the benefits of diversity.26
These goals seem largely unobjectionable, although some pause is
required to consider whether all of the practices are as efficient as
they look. There may be an irrational attachment to elegant
uniformity,27 for instance, and commercial norms can develop in
inefficient ways, as has been discussed in a substantial economic
literature.28
More pointedly, some other less beneficial economic activity may
be going on, even on the surface. There may be rent-seeking as
monopolistic potentials are realized; whenever players get together
to form rules, concerns about competition arise. The group may seek
to fix prices, to coordinate their practices in a way that has an effect
similar to price fixing, to exclude others from entering the market,
and so on. By erecting an elaborate regime to which all serious
market players must adhere, a group can certainly achieve
24. See id. at 721-22.
25. Cf. Basedow, supra note 1, at 716. For a study of codification efforts in other
contexts, see Lisa Bernstein, The Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 2’s
Incorporation Strategy: A Preliminary Study, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 710, 780 (1999)
[hereinafter Bernstein, Questionable Basis]; see also Lisa Bernstein, Private
Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules,
Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001); Lisa Bernstein, Opting out of
the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J.
LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992).
26. For a consideration of the costs and benefits of uniformity and diversity, see
Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, An Economic Analysis of Uniform State
Laws, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 131, 137-41 (1996). Note that sometimes even private rulemakers are able to achieve a remarkable degree of uniformity, possibly because their
work is of outstanding quality, and possibly because they lobby public lawmakers,
successfully arguing that any state or party that fails to adopt the privately made
rules will suffer high transaction costs, obstreperous coordination problems, and
consequent economic detriment. These arguments have been well studied with
respect to the Uniform Commercial Code, almost all of which has been enacted in one
form or another by virtually all U.S. states, even though it is promulgated by the
private American Law Institute and the quasi-private National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Some leading articles are collected in
Snyder, Private Lawmaking, supra note 3, at 383 n.35. The nearly uniform adoption
of the UCP in international letters of credit is also often remarked. For some
estimated statistics, see id. at 391, n.71.
27. See Ribstein & Kobayashi, supra note 26, at 150-55, 183-84, 187.
28. See infra note 49.
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anticompetitive effects. But anticompetitive effects are a lesser
concern as myriad antitrust and competition laws are in place to
address the problem. Although enforcement may not be optimal, it is
nevertheless a reasonably robust threat to deter misbehavior.
Other activity is not as well addressed by publicly made law,
however. Professor Bernstein has observed that some industry
players may seek to have their rules imposed on other industry
players—not to raise barriers to entry, but to gain a competitive
advantage over a rival that will have to change the way it does
business. This practice is a form of rent-seeking and such behavior
may be expected.29 For example, the (successful) effort of moneycenter banks to use a UCP revision to consolidate their position over
other banks, and to enhance their revenues, should be no surprise.30
Further, while one actor or group of actors may seek to gain
advantages over rivals, the organizational entity itself may seek to
extract rents for itself, even at the expense of its members. Caution
about casting an unjustified aspersion leads me to state this
possibility in the abstract:
Suppose there is an Association (A) composed of many
businesses and banks (B1 to B500). A publishes a widely
adopted and influential rulebook that arguably is in need of
revision. The revision will cost each B, on average, $100,000.
The revision will cost A $200,000. A can expect to earn $1
million from publishing revenues generated by the revision.
Each B faces a return that is uncertain; the return could be
negative because of continuing costs of implementation,
unexpected and new litigation costs, and so on, or could be
positive, based on reduced litigation and transaction costs.
In addition, there are many further businesses and
banks (C1 to C10,000) that use the rulebook but that are not
members of A. The revision will cost each, on average,
$20,000 in initial implementation costs. Further costs and
benefits are again uncertain and could be either positive or
negative.
Suppose further that members of the staff at A will gain
job security and prestige, as well as greater employment
prospects in the future, if they work on the revision of the
rulebook.
On these facts, the cost to the members of A is $50 million in
return for benefits that no one can predict with confidence. The cost
to the industry (B and C) is $250 million, again with no more certain
benefits. The cost to A is a substantial $200,000 but with an
29. See Bernstein, Questionable Basis, supra note 25, at 740-44.
30. See Snyder, Private Lawmaking, supra note 3, at 393-94.
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attractive return of $1 million, along with prestige, job security, job
prospects, and other intangible benefits.
These numbers may be exaggerated, but I suspect that few
readers will doubt that this revision will be undertaken, and many
readers probably can think of such revisions that have indeed been
undertaken in similar circumstances.
While these ruminations can be nothing more than surmise on
my part, if the model is plausible then the conclusion is that
coordination can encourage inefficient rent-seeking that sometimes
is not fully recognized. Private lawmaking can have economic goals,
but those goals are not necessarily efficient. Several modes of
analysis offer tools for understanding these problems, and they can
be considered in terms of political economy, collective action, and
bureaucracy, or in terms of economics, market power, and agency.
On the first set of terms, the conflict is between the staff and the C
group, and to a lesser extent, the B group. Because the C group lacks
representation in A, the staff can appropriate rents from C without
worry. In addition, but to a lesser extent, the staff conflicts with the
B group as well, but in this case the staff must be careful because
the B group ultimately controls A. This control, however, may be
more theoretical than real. With concentrated benefits and low costs
to the staff, and diffuse and uncertain costs and benefits to the B
group, the staff or management can and will drive the agenda. The
dynamics might work otherwise if the costs to the B group were
better known, or if those costs were less dispersed among the group,
or if the staff did not have an incentive to keep those costs as obscure
as possible. In this case, however, the staff may well achieve the
rulemaking revision, even though society in general and the industry
in particular may have been better off either without the revision or
by waiting longer before embarking on the project.
Along the same lines, law and economics offers another
terminology for this problem, seeing the matter in terms of a
principal-agent conundrum coupled with market power and negative
externalities. Most of the costs ($200 million) of the revision will be
borne by the C group, which has no say in a decision that will be
taken by the staff and the B group. This is a typical example of
externalizing costs. The B group itself bears some of the costs, so A
and the staff cannot externalize all costs. As before, though, the
diffuse costs among the B group and the concentrated benefits at A
render the B group unable, or at least unlikely, to police A and its
staff, even though A in theory consists simply of the B group and is
under the control of the B group. This point is fortified by the
problem of information costs. Knowing the costs engendered by the
revision will be difficult—costly—under the best of circumstances,
and here the staff will have an incentive to keep those information
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costs prohibitively high to the B group. Although the staff is hardly
in control of all of the information, the costs of information, added to
the concentrated benefit to the staff and the diffuse costs to the B
group will make the revision likely. The B group, while in theory the
principal, will in practice often be unable or unwilling to exert
effective control over A and the staff, though both are agents of the B
group.
If there were viable rivals to A and its rulebook, or sufficiently
low barriers to entry, the problem would not arise. In rulegenerating situations, however, these checks on the power of A and
its staff will often be illusory. The rulebook likely holds much of its
importance from being in widespread use (a network effect). For a
serious rival to emerge, its rules would have to come into sufficiently
widespread use to carry the network benefits of rules. The point of
rules, after all, is to assure that not only one party but that other
counterparties will be following them. In this situation rivals or
market entrants will have great difficulty in emerging. This frequent
reality will contribute to A’s market power and will dampen
potential market responses.
None of these observations is really new, and extensive work in
other contexts buttresses the point. The literature on the de facto
independence of corporate management from shareholder control31
illustrates what is much the same problem, although perhaps in a
paler version as the network benefits of rulemaking do not
necessarily apply to the typical corporate context. In terms of
political economy, and in a closer context, Professors Schwartz and
Scott have shown that the prestige of achieving enacted law reform
can be an attractive prize, a lure that can shape the formal rules into
platitudes or principles that may be less efficient than harder,
clearer rules.32 To simplify their conclusion: faced with a choice
between proposing a soft rule that will pass and a hard rule that will
not, the “reformers” choose the soft rule in order to have an
accomplishment to show for their efforts, even if a hard rule would
be better.
This observation leads to two related points, leaving aside the
sizeable question whether soft rules (standards) are really bad and
hard rules (rules) are really good. First, the political economy of
31. Recent and helpful contributions from prominent scholars include Lucian A.
Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675 (2007); Lynn A.
Stout, The Mythical Benefits of Shareholder Control, 93 VA. L. REV. 789 (2007). They
provide ample entry into the large body of scholarship on this issue.
32. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private
Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 595 (1995); see also Robert E. Scott, The Politics of
Article 9, 80 VA. L. REV. 1783 (1994); Robert E. Scott, The Truth About Secured
Financing, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1436 (1997); Robert E. Scott, Commentary on
Professor Carlson’s Article: The Mythology of Article 9, 79 MINN. L. REV. 853 (1995).
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private lawmaking in general and of the ALI and NCCUSL in
particular is different from the political economy of public
lawmaking. Second, different private lawmakers can be expected to
be characterized by different political economies. A private
organization dedicated to law reform and consisting of lawyers,
judges, and academics is different from a private organization
consisting of a significant staff but whose members are banks and
businesses, and both of these private organizations are different
from public legislatures and from courts. And of course the public
institutions themselves can differ significantly in their structure and
goals, and thus their political economies. The European Union is
dedicated to the common market and its legislation is thus
purportedly aimed at market concerns,33 but the existence of an
enormous bureaucracy interested in the agglomeration of further
power, prestige, and money in central E.U. institutions can have a
significant effect on the shape of E.U. law.
C.

Alternatives: Of Competing Goals and Logic

Keeping this range of public and private lawmakers in mind, we
may analyze the point further, noting that the goals of the
lawmaking organizations are different, the training and outlook of
the members are different, and each lawmaker will follow a different
method in generating rules. Perhaps logic is better than method, as
a method implies a purposeful approach that may be lacking. Logic,
on the other hand, suggests that each mode of rule generation makes
sense on the terms of the particular system and the world in which it
operates—with its peculiar assumptions, definitions, orientations,
and goals. Some organizations and their members may be more
lawyerly and attuned to procedural values, while others may be
more businesslike and attentive to economic considerations. Others
may be academic. As such, they may be interested in rationality and
technical coherence. They may instead prefer theoretical or
ideological commitments, like a sociological approach to law, or an
aim to implement immanent norms, or an effort to achieve
distributional fairness. Some rulemaking may be spontaneous while
some may be deliberative. Some rule-makers are market-driven
while others are democratic.
This abstract catalog brings to mind a number of concrete
examples. Consider the American Law Institute and its lawyerly and
procedural projects,34 or the Lando Commission and its careful

33. See Michaels & Jansen, supra note 3, at 861.
34. This characterization is perhaps most apparent from the verbatim
transcripts of the ALI meetings, taken down by a court reporter and published from
1923 to the present in the A.L.I. PROCEEDINGS.
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academic work.35 Then contrast the Lando Commission’s Principles
of European Contract Law with the approach to harmonization
advanced by the “Social Justice Manifesto” and its exponents.36 On
another continent and in a different generation, the original UCC
project has long been associated with sociological jurisprudence and
an attempt to attune the law to immanent norms.37 On the less
purposeful side, recall the trade customs that Lisa Bernstein
studied, particularly as they existed before codification. These were
more spontaneous, and even variable to the point (according to
Professor Bernstein) of nonexistence.38 Less spontaneous but
nevertheless keenly attuned to the market and its concerns are the
listing standards of the New York Stock Exchange.39 Finally, many
bodies contend for the mantle of deliberation and democracy. Some
particular examples may not be overly controversial. The debate in
the House of Lords over a transformation of itself that was
tantamount to abolishing the privileges of the vast majority of its
members comes to mind as an extraordinary instance of a
deliberative lawmaking process.40 The democratic ideal is perhaps
exemplified nowhere better than in its ancient prototype,41 whose
legacy countless governments still claim.
Of course these examples are oversimplified, and each instance
of real lawmaking efforts will doubtless include several of the
characteristics listed; there is certainly a taste of democratic
regulation in the New York Stock Exchange rules, despite their
35. See PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW, PARTS I AND II (Ole Lando &
Hugh Beale eds., 2000); PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW, PART III (Ole
Lando et al. eds., 2003).
36. See Study Group on Social Justice in European Private Law, Social Justice
in European Contract Law: A Manifesto, 10 EUR. L.J. 653 (2004) [hereinafter
Manifesto]; cf. Fernanda Nicola & Ugo A. Mattei, A Social Dimension in European
Private Law? The Call for Setting a Progressive Agenda, 41 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1
(2006).
37. See generally Allen R. Kamp, Between-the-Wars Social Thought: Karl
Llewellyn, Legal Realism, and the Uniform Commercial Code in Context, 59 ALBANY
L. REV. 325 (1995); Allen R. Kamp, Uptown Act: A History of the Uniform
Commercial Code 1940-1949, 51 SMU L. REV. 275 (1998); Allen R. Kamp, Downtown
Code: A History of the Uniform Commercial Code 1949-1954, 49 BUFFALO L. REV. 359
(2001); Zipporah Batshaw Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn and the
Merchant Rules, 100 HARV. L. REV. 465 (1987).
38. See supra note 25; see also Basedow, supra note 1, at 709.
39. See N.Y. STOCK EXCHANGE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL (CCH) § 1.
40. The major debates in the House of Lords took place on Oct. 14 and 15, 1998,
Feb. 17, 22, and 23, 1999, and Mar. 29 and 30, 1999. See 593 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th
ser.) (1998) 920; id. at 1052; 597 id. at 685 (1999); id. at 841; id. at 955; 599 id. at 47;
id. at 204. See generally A HOUSE FOR THE FUTURE: REPORT FROM THE ROYAL
COMMISSION ON REFORM OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS (2000). I do not mean to imply
that the debates in the House of Commons were insignificant, but the Lords provide
a cleaner example of non-democratic deliberation than the Commons.
41. See generally DONALD KAGAN, PERICLES OF ATHENS AND THE BIRTH OF
DEMOCRACY (1998).
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market origin and orientation.42 The main point here is that
different lawmakers, public and private, will have very different
characteristics and will make rules according to their own internal
logic and orientation. Put simply, private lawmakers and public
lawmakers compete by offering rules that are the result of different
and competing goals and logic. This competition flags the dynamics
of the mixed jurisdiction, and it indicates the need for study of the
competing systems, just as the civil law, the common law, and civiland common-law mixes have richly repaid careful study.
II.

HOW’S A BODY TO CHOOSE?

The fertility of Professor Basedow’s observations comes at this
step, which is deciding how to milk the learning for well-informed
action. The active question is how to choose between (a) rules, or (b)
systems of rules, or (c) systems of rule generation. In other words, we
could choose between particular rules in particular contexts, and/or
choose between different sets of rules, and/or choose a method, logic,
or institution for generating rules. The uninformed observer would
presumably think we had already chosen a system for generating
rules, at least domestically, based on the constitution of the nationstate. This myth of teenage civics is powerful, as myths are, but
misleadingly elliptical. It does not give an accurate description of
rule generation even within the nation-state, much less in the
international realm that by definition is located beyond the nationstate. Sophisticated observation discloses that not all rules will come
from a congress or parliament or legislature, nor necessarily from a
constitutionally created supranational government like the United
Nations or the European Union. Custom matters, as do individual
transactors and their associations, whether they be international
labor unions, multinational business corporations, or even wider
groups like industry associations or other nonprofit nongovernmental organizations. If we at least assume, then, that a
commitment to a traditional constitutional structure does not resolve
all questions of how to make rules, the question becomes: how to
choose?
Gillian Hadfield has argued that in the economic realm,
efficiency is the right criterion for choosing a system of rule
generation and she therefore comes down for private lawmaking
rather than public lawmaking, with some qualification.43 Many
42. For more discussion and further history and sources, see Snyder, Private
Lawmaking, supra note 3, at 384-88.
43. Gillian K. Hadfield, Privatizing Commercial Law, 24 REG. 40, 41 (Spring
2001) [hereinafter Hadfield, Privatizing]; see also Gillian K. Hadfield & Eric Talley,
On Public versus Private Provision of Corporate Law, 22 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 414, 43640 (2006); cf. Gillian K. Hadfield, The Price of Law: How the Market for Lawyers
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others make similar arguments about choosing specific rules or sets
of rules, whether based on neoclassical efficiency44 or new
institutional economics.45 A related scholarly project addresses how
best to set the default rules of contract46 and even the seemingly
perverse possibility of penalty default rules, to achieve the goal of
efficiency.47 In terms of mixed jurisdictions, economic studies and
assessments are a current rage, assessing the economic success of
systems based on the common law as opposed to the civil law.48 We
also see similar work that debates the efficiency vel non of
commercial customs.49 Especially in the United States, the
Distorts the Justice System, 98 MICH. L. REV. 953 (2000); Gillian K. Hadfield,
Privatizing Commercial Law: Lessons from ICANN, 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L.
257 (2002).
44. Judge Posner is perhaps the best known exponent of this approach, and his
corpus is immense. The idea should be clear enough from RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (7th ed. 2007).
45. See, e.g., Christian Kirchner, An Economic Analysis of Choice-of-Law and
Choice-of-Forum Clauses, in ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW,
supra note 4, at 33, 40-41.
46. See Basedow, supra note 1, at 715-17.
47. The seminal article is Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in
Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91
(1989). For some other prominent discussion and debate, see Ian Ayres, Preliminary
Thoughts on Optimal Tailoring of Contractual Rules, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1
(1993); Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the
Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729 (1992); Lucian Arye Bebchuk &
Steven Shavell, Information and the Scope of Liability for Breach of Contract: The
Rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, 7 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 284 (1991); Jules L. Coleman,
Douglas D. Heckathorn & Steven M. Maser, A Bargaining Theory Approach to
Default Provisions and Disclosure Rules in Contract Law, 12 HARV. J.L. PUB. POL’Y
639 (1989); Clayton P. Gillette, Commercial Relationships and the Selection of
Default Rules for Remote Risks, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 535 (1990); Jason S. Johnston,
Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100 YALE
L.J. 615 (1990); see also Symposium on Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 3 S.
CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1 (1993). Lest anyone think that the debate could not still be
going, see Eric Maskin, On the Rationale for Penalty Default Rules, 33 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 557 (2006); Eric A. Posner, There Are No Penalty Default Rules in Contract Law,
33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 563 (2006); Ian Ayres, Ya-HUH: There Are and Should Be
Penalty Defaults, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 589 (2006).
48. Michaels & Jansen, supra note 3, at 866, allude briefly to this work, which is
the fruit of a considerable scholarly devotion. For a recent reassessment and review
of the literature, see Rafael La Porta et al., The Economic Consequences of Legal
Origins, 47 J. ECON. LIT. (forthcoming) (currently available on SSRN).
49. Some helpful contributions to this debate include ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND
SOCIAL NORMS (2002); Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy:
The Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
1643 (1996); Clayton P. Gillette, Harmony and Stasis in Trade Usages for
International Sales, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 707 (1999); Clayton P. Gillette, Lock-In Effects
in Law and Norms, 78 B.U. L. REV. 813 (1998); Juliet P. Kostritsky, Judicial
Incorporation of Trade Usages: A Functional Solution to the Opportunism Problem,
39 CONN. L. REV. 451 (2006); Jody S. Kraus, Legal Design and the Evolution of
Commercial Norms, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 377 (1997); Jody S. Kraus & Steven D. Walt,
In Defense of the Incorporation Strategy, in JURISPRUDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF
CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW 193 (Jody S. Kraus & Steven D. Walt eds., 2000);
Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1697
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application of economic analysis to the law has been a sizeable and
growing industry since the 1980s, and there seems to be little worry
that economics as a field will find itself unable to provide insights, if
not answers, in response to legal questions about rules and rule
generation. Further economic work assessing the relative merits of
publicly versus privately made law seems promising.
At the same time, a more difficult issue is to what degree the
economic criterion is sufficient or even appropriate. Professor
Hadfield carefully notes that economic criteria are appropriate in the
economic realm but not in the justice realm,50 but this distinction
has so far eluded my grasp, and I have developed some doubts as to
the possibility of divorcing economic transactions from notions of
justice. Similar skepticism is advanced with greater rigor elsewhere
in this symposium.51 It is certainly true that if an important function
of private law is to protect private parties from the state,52 then
notions of privacy and autonomy that are grounded in justice and
morality are central to the enterprise of generating and choosing
rules of private law.
These thoughts bring up the other prominent criteria (aside
from economics) used in choosing rules or systems related to rules.
Liberal conceptions of human activity and libertarian ideas about
freedom of contract are certainly traditional modes of assessing
privately made rules, subject of course to many limits, some of which
are obvious and some of which are the subject of ancient and
continuing debate. Professor Basedow reminds us of pragmatic
limits on contractual freedom; allocating property rights ab initio,
protecting competitive markets, and preventing market failures are
insusceptible of private solutions.53 In addition, there are the well
known boundaries imposed by established policies or by the
importance of stopping parties from externalizing their costs. These
contractual limits sound just as strongly in the realm of private
lawmaking, and even more so, as the effects are greater and broader
when private rules reach across the globe.54 Still, the liberal
capitalist society whose growth continues is premised on these
notions of freedom and of assent. The basis of these norms will not
be reexamined here,55 but the norms themselves should nevertheless
(1996).
50. Hadfield, Privatizing, supra note 43, at 44-45.
51. Peer Zumbansen, Law After the Welfare State: Formalism, Functionalism,
and the Ironic Turn of Reflexive Law, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 769 (2008).
52. See Hans-Peter Haferkamp, The Science of Private Law and the State in
Nineteenth Century Germany, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 667 (2008).
53. Basedow, supra note 1, at 715-19.
54. For more detail on the problems of externalities as applied in the realm of
private lawmaking, see Snyder, Molecular Federalism, supra note 15, at 442-43.
55. For some relatively recent entries into the venerable literature on assent and
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be on the surface. They are not the only norms, but they are among
the best entrenched and—I suspect—most widely accepted.
Other norms compete for prominence as well. Their technocratic
tilt links them more to economics than to liberalism, but whatever
their functional character, they are surely important in economic
transactions. We may choose (or allow others to choose) rules
generated by bodies with particular knowledge, expertise, or skill. To
return to Professor Basedow’s example of the UCP, one may argue
that the Banking Commission of the International Chamber of
Commerce has special (and perhaps relatively inexpensive) access to
the institutional knowledge of businesses intimately involved in the
issuance, examination, and payment of letters of credit. To move to
other areas of economic activity, particular people with great
expertise in the comparative and international law of sales may be
chosen as the best instrument for devising improved or harmonized
rules for international sales.56 Such avenues have the twin
advantages of greater information at lower cost. Rulemaking, after
all, is not costless and—putting aside the costs of implementing new
rules—those costs ceteris paribus ought to be kept low. Along these
lines, efficiency and fairness both require that the costs of
rulemaking be borne by those who will benefit from the rules. Thus,
rulemaking may be assigned to organizations that can effectively
internalize the costs. If new rules are needed on bills of lading, the
shippers and carriers ought to pay for the making of the rules.
These technocratic considerations are all important in a well
engineered system of generating rules, but the analysis must also
account for—and perhaps end with—principles of democratic
legitimacy. Florian Rödl has written persuasively on this point
elsewhere in this volume,57 but some consideration is worthwhile
here. Before arriving at complex and potentially moral issues, we
may begin with the practical side of democracy and democratic
institutions. Assuming away corruption, agency costs, and other
problems, democracy brings legitimacy, and that very legitimacy can
contract, see Snyder, Custom, supra note 11, at 632.
56. See supra note 35 and accompanying text (on the Lando Commission). We
may also recall earlier efforts before the United Nations Convention on Contracts for
the International Sale of Goods was hatched. See Peter Huber, Comparative Sales
Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 8, at 939-41
(discussing the role of Ernst Rabel in efforts that led to the Convention relating to a
Uniform Law of International Sales (ULIS) and the Convention relating to a Uniform
Law on the Formation of Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (ULF)). I am
also grateful to Ralf Michaels for pointing out the relevance of Hannes Rösler,
Siebzig Jahre Recht des Warenkaufs von Ernst Rabel, Werk- und Wirkgeschichte, 70
RABELSZ 793, 798-802 (2006).
57. Florian Rödl, Private Law Beyond the Democractic Order? On the
Legitimatory Problem of Private Law “Beyond the State,” 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 743
(2008).
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achieve successful rule acceptance as well as rule generation. More
specifically, to persuade private actors and sovereign nations to
adopt rules, one can try to devise the best possible rules. One might
also succeed, and perhaps succeed more, by adopting rules that were
convincingly the result of a legitimate, democratic process. The work
of building consensus and gaining the participation and investment
of those who will adopt the rules is itself an important practical
strategy for assigning rulemaking to democratic institutions, or at
least institutions that are perceived as legitimate. Although this
particular case may not hold, one might at least surmise that
international sales rules that resulted from an intensive and debated
democratic process within the United Nations achieved greater
adoption and use compared to a product that was viewed as more
academic or that resulted from a less robust institution. Whether
this is true of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods (as opposed to ULIS and ULF)58 in
particular is something that I do not know, but the argument seems
plausible, and may well hold in other cases even if not in this one.
Next, recall that private law is hardly immune from questions of
distributive justice. Aside from political commitments,59 anyone who
labors in the fields of contracts or commercial law faces these
questions constantly. With contracts viewed as devices for allocating
risks,60 and with the necessity that all contracts be incomplete, the
default rules of contract law will necessarily allocate risks that have
distributive impact. Even default rules that are displaced by
agreement have an allocative effect in that they distribute
information and transaction costs, imposing those costs on the party
forced to either disclose information (e.g., “seller will not be liable if
the machine does not work the way such machines are supposed to
work”) or be liable.61
Consider another example along these lines, even more arcane
and technical. The swap contracts so ably discussed by Professor
Riles62 raise great normative questions. As opposed to the quotidian
contract of sale, these swap contracts are virtually unknown outside
a few specialized circles. Yet their operation for allocating collateral
in the case of a default will have an immense impact on whether
businesses in crisis will be able to reorganize themselves as going
58. See Huber, supra note 56, at 940-41; see also UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION
CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS, Apr. 11, 1980, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf. 97/18, reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 668, art. 35(2)(a) [hereinafter CISG].
59. See supra note 36 and accompanying text (Manifesto).
60. The classic statement is Edwin Patterson, The Apportionment of Business
Risks Through Legal Devices, 24 COLUM. L. REV. 335 (1924).
61. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-314; CISG, supra note 58, art. 35(2)(a).
62. Annelise Riles, The Anti-Network: Private Global Governance, Legal
Knowledge, and the Legitimacy of the State, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 605 (2008).
ON
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concerns or will instead be carved up for creditors who have staked
individualized, contracted-for claims. If the latter, further questions
arise as to whether to give rein to absolute priority based on these
individualized contracts-cum-conveyances or to allow some other
kind of prioritized claims, such as for workers or tort victims. The
way the law understands and implements the private orders created
by collateralized swap contracts will move policies one way or
another on each of these fundamental questions.63
These familiar themes need little rehearsal, but their
implications for distributive justice should be made clear. I do not—
and would not—assume simplistic propositions, like sellers and
secured creditors are big, rich, evil corporations and that buyers and
unsecured creditors are small, one-shot, poor, good victims. But I
also would not assume that allocating certain burdens to sellers or to
buyers, and that making some rules defaults and others immutable,
are technical decisions without distributive implications. Of course
Professor Basedow’s paper does not indulge any such simple
assumptions either, and I do not mean to imply otherwise. Even as a
descriptive matter, however, we should not neglect the likelihood
that allocating rulemaking power to private actors will have some
important repercussions on distribution of wealth. The question is
empirical and therefore no doubt complex. Nevertheless, I wish at
least to raise the issue explicitly and to refer to another of its
aspects, which might be seen as competition, or federalism.
Whether in the realm of public or private lawmaking,
competition is at least theoretically possible, and may be quite
desirable in and of itself. The very competition of legal systems that
occurs in any mixed jurisdiction implies not a competitive game but
a potential choice. Where more than one system can provide rules,
the consumers of rules can choose. Choice itself implies freedom, a
good in itself, and competition suggests a race for improvement.
Freedom, choice, a competition for betterment, and all the interests
of diversity suggest that one way to respond to the question of this
section—how is a body, whether it be a body politic or a body
economic, to choose?—is not to answer, but to embrace and even
foment competing systems.64 At the same time, though, the
drawbacks of such a complex system cannot escape notice, and the
costs of diversity and the loss of uniform solutions can be serious.
Moreover, competitive lawmaking races, which inevitably involve
differing goals, can lead to one kind of race to the top (e.g., increased
tax revenues) that might potentially lead to a race to the bottom

63. See id.
64. On this pluralism point, see Berman, supra note 21; see also Hanoch Dagan,
The Limited Autonomy of Private Law, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 809, 818 (2008).
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along another axis (e.g., shareholder protection). These are large
questions, and as with the other choices outlined above, cannot be
considered in detail here.65 The point for now is that in a realm
beyond a monolithic state, there are not only countless choices but
multiplicitous criteria by which to choose. Even the criteria require
choice, and the choice is one of polity. This raises the last point.
III. THE INESCAPABLE NORMATIVE QUESTION, SHADED BY POSSIBILITY
In the end, “economic regulation,” the topic assigned for
consideration here, cannot escape these normative questions any
more than law can. They are akin to the questions of validity and
legitimacy raised by Professors Jansen and Michaels.66 Professor
Basedow has given a masterly description of the private lawmaking
phenomenon within the realm of economic regulation, as well as its
relation to public lawmaking. His description is crucial for informed
analysis. This comment mainly seeks to round the picture, in
however sketchy a fashion, by referring to the problem of
prescription in a compound, complex polity that consists of
competing systems—public and private—for generating rules in a
realm that transcends the modern nation-state.
The problem of prescription, probably the most important, is
also the most difficult. With competing public and private regulators
of economic activity, the problem translates into a further question
about the constitution of rulemaking—the constitutional structure,
or the meta-rules that themselves establish the framework for
making further rules.67 Such rules would presumably come from the
state,68 and this assumption was implicit in the preceding discussion
that suggested that there is a choice to be made between publicly
made rules and privately made rules. The assumption is
questionable, though, and the issue of what the state should do, in
the world beyond the state, needs to be preceded by the question of
65. A less abbreviated consideration of the advantages and disadvantages of a
competitive, federalist-style regime of private and public lawmaking is the focus of
Snyder, Molecular Federalism, supra note 15.
66. See Jansen & Michaels, supra note 17, passim but especially at 393-94;
Michaels & Jansen, supra note 3, at 874-77, 879-81.
67. See Snyder, Molecular Federalism, supra note 15, at 439 (citing Ladeur).
68. This seems true given the observable facts, that is, as a matter of inductive
reasoning. If rules on conflict of laws were to recognize non-state norms, see
Michaels, supra note 10, those conflicts rules—meta-rules—still seem inescapably to
come from the state. Although the current lex mercatoria may be proposed as a law
that does not depend on the state, the proposition is at best debatable, and current
practice suggests that the lex mercatoria partakes of both state and non-state
elements. See Ralf Michaels, The True Lex Mercatoria: Law Beyond the State, 14 IND.
J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 447 (2007). Possibilities of a lex mercatoria truly beyond the
state (i.e., independent of state mechanisms, or at least tolerance) so far appear
merely theoretical.
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what the state can do. Recall that publicly made rules do not always
prevail.69
In the globalized world it is perhaps usual to think that force,
which had become the monopoly of the state,70 has become almost
useless because business relations take place beyond the power of a
single state. The physical force that the state can wield with
impunity is still present, but it is rarely important in economic
relations, with the exception of a few areas. Even in these few
exceptional areas, the brutal puissance of the state is difficult and
expensive to invoke and is used rarely. With this dynamic, the
question must be reformulated, from what the state can do, to what
it is worth having the state do. At the same time, we may well
observe that a subtler force can be wielded privately in sufficiently
well-planned transactions, as when assets (like the shares in a
corporation) are put in escrow in an offshore jurisdiction. As few
enterprises can function solely offshore, however, there is still a
sphere for state influence, particularly through the rules of private
international law and on the recognition and enforcement of
judgments.71 A complicated and dynamic division of power thus
subsists. Our world is characterized by sophisticated inroads on the
state monopoly on force and by the attenuating but still real
importance of the force that the state retains. Such a world requires
a fine balance, not only of efficiency, but of polity. One choice, one
normative order, is unlikely. A more complicated music can be
expected.
IV. A METAPHORICAL CONCLUSION
With such a delicate and dynamic weighing in mind, neither
public lawmaking nor private lawmaking will always prevail. In the
end, we are left with constant and changing choices between publicly
and privately made systems of rules, although as Professor Basedow
observes, certain areas tend to gravitate to one or the other.72 One of
the chief points of this comment is to show that the goals, method,
and logic of these systems are quite different, but not unknowable.
Particularly in a world of diminishing effectiveness and continuing
costliness of state power, the choices will occur infinitely, and each

69. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text (on the UCP prevailing over
U.C.C. Article 5). Other similar examples are discussed in Snyder, Molecular
Federalism, supra note 15.
70. See, e.g., MAX WEBER, Politics as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS
IN SOCIOLOGY 77, 78 (1958).
71. See, e.g., Gran Canaria Timeshare Cases, Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [German
Federal Court of Justice], Mar. 19, 1997, RECHTSPRECHUNG ZUM INTERNATIONALEN
PRIVATRECHT [IPRSPR.] 1997, no.34.
72. Basedow, supra note 1, at 720-22.
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choice will effectuate the different goals and logic that generated it.
To understand this abstract reality, I suggest the metaphor of a
keyboard trill.
Trills occur in many varieties, but the analogy can begin most
simply by imagining a pianist playing two notes, separately, rapidly,
and repeatedly, sometimes over the course of several measures.73
Played as a trill, the notes make a different sound from either note
played on its own, and different from the sound of the notes played
simultaneously. While this complex sound plays from one hand, the
main business of the music plays from the other hand. Eventually,
the trill must resolve; it cannot go on forever. How it resolves is the
question, and the answer rests with the other hand: the main
business of the music, which is infinitely variable, but determinate
at any moment. This potential variety of the music is a key piece of
the metaphor. Although the possibilities for the main music are
infinite, it will go on in a particular way and a way that will (and
must) obey the logic of the music. The trill will resolve in a way
determined by the main music and the musical logic of the
composition. The law is no different.

73. An example that should be familiar to many occurs twice in J.S. Bach’s TwoPart Invention No. 4.

